From Side Show to Centre Stage: Civil Conflict after the Cold War

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The end of US–Soviet rivalry has given civil war a more prominent place in international politics, as well as in scholarship. The commonly held view that the world is currently in an era of more and increasingly savage civil conflict is, in part, a matter of increased attention to a problem that has long been with us. This article reviews recent research on the incidence of internal conflict. It finds that this literature calls into question assumptions of simple causal relationships between democratization, natural resources, ethnicity, and/or inequality and civil war. The most important area of consensus is that civil war, typical of weak states, is a problem of underdevelopment as well as politics.

Keywords civil war • conflict • democracy • ethnicity • natural resource

THE END OF THE COLD WAR fundamentally altered the place of civil war in international politics. Wars in nations such as Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Mozambique and throughout a chain of states in Central America were no longer useful as fields in which to wage the contest between the communist and Western spheres of influence. Some of these civil wars ended because of the evaporation of the combatants' superpower patronage or their own logic; others raged on or emerged in previously stable areas, as in the disintegrating communist bloc.

Though local dynamics and interests are nearly always the key factors in understanding the causes and outcomes of civil violence, major states generally interpret such conflicts (and decide if, when, and how to become involved with them) in the simpler terms of their dominant global security agendas. The US–Soviet balance of power provided the West with just such a strategic prism through which to view civil conflict. As this concern faded, the great powers were left to define a new paradigm. More than a decade after the end of the Cold War, the policy community is still debating the nature of its agenda in internal conflict zones. International interests in such

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areas are at once difficult to define, controversial, and diverse: the regional and global security threats that fester in conflict areas; humanitarian intervention in favor of ideals such as democracy or human rights; ambitions of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. In this security environment, civil conflicts – once mere proxy fights against the communist threat – have taken centre stage.[1]

Absent the focus on superpower conflict, the 1990s saw a flurry of media, policy, and scholarly interest in civil war, in part because although most researchers believe that the incidence of civil conflict has fallen since the end of the Cold War, it did not evaporate in the same way in which interstate conflict seemed to. After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1991, there was no other major conflict of a clearly interstate nature until war broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998. By contrast, throughout the 1990s civil war, separatism, and ethnic violence shocked and troubled the international system, finally attracting concern as distinct local phenomena in their own right rather than as so many dominoes in a grand strategy. Today, it is a commonplace to hear that the primary global security threat is not a war between powerful states but zones of internal conflict and contested or absent governance where illegal drugs, human and weapons trafficking, HIV/AIDS, famine, terrorism, and banditry can thrive.

The attention paid to civil war in the 1990s was not just a matter of the persistence of such conflicts at a time when the interstate system seemed to be growing more peaceful (after all, the majority of conflicts have been internal for decades), but also a function of the fact that the interstate peace allowed United Nations involvement in civil conflict as never before. The superpower military advisers moved out, and the Blue Helmets moved in. Before 1989, only 15 UN peacekeeping missions had ever been deployed, and all but five of these missions dealt primarily with interstate conflicts. From 1989 to 2000, there were 38 UN peacekeeping missions, all but five of which were deployed in regards to an intrastate conflict. There were also experiments in more robustly mandated peace 'enforcement' by UN forces. Yet, initial optimism regarding the potential for international institutions to keep and perhaps even create peace was profoundly shaken by the tortured missions deployed to Somalia and the disintegrating Yugoslavia, and the robust mission that never was deployed to Rwanda.[2]

[1] Some media commentators and scholars have claimed to find fundamentally new characteristics in cases of post-Cold War civil violence, usually characterizing these conflicts as largely apolitical and particularly vicious (Duffield, 1998; Kaldor, 1999; Snow, 1996). But, as Stathis Kalyvas (2001: 99) convincingly argues, 'the distinction drawn between post-cold war conflicts and their predecessors may be attributable more to the demise of readily available conceptual categories than to the existence of profound differences'.

[2] The changing role of the UN, the international system, and other outside actors in civil conflict has led to its own body of important and interesting scholarship; see Boulden (2001); Cousens & Kumar (2001); Doyle & Sambanis (2000); Doyle, Johnstone & Orr (1997); Malone & Wermester (2000); Malone (1998); Paris (1997); and Terry (2002).

What We Know

Policymakers are currently deeply interested in civil conflict as a threat to international security, and scholarship on the topic has accelerated in recent years. Thus, now is a useful time to ask what research has discovered about the global incidence of civil conflict. Internal war as a worldwide phenomenon is often studied through macro-level research. Simplified models of the onset of conflict are used to identify features of civil war that persist across relatively large time periods and/or geographic areas, as well as the possibility of consistent and important variation according to era or region. The aim is to show that a given set of explanatory variables are correlated to the observed presence of internal strife. However, micro-level approaches, which can conduct more subtle investigations of cause and effect in particular sets of cases, are, as we shall see, often necessary to interpret these models.

Macro studies of where and when civil war occurs have advanced to the point of considerable consensus in identifying factors that put a nation at high risk for onset of a civil conflict; in fact, given the variety in the models that have been used to test these findings, the consensus is often remarkable (Gates, 2003).[3] Perhaps unsurprisingly, conflict is far more likely in nations with recent involvement in a previous civil war (Richardson, 1960). Such a pattern reflects the very real difficulties in resolving the power dilemmas that participants killed to contest in the first place (Hegre et al., 2001). But it also speaks to the fact that a prior conflict is likely to have directly augmented other risk factors for civil war, including political instability, meaning frequent changes in the type of government or in regime, a low level of economic development, and the presence of a large diaspora that can repatriate funding to combatants (Collier et al., 2003). All of these factors relate, in different ways, to the single risk factor for civil war around which scholars are in most theoretical agreement: state strength. Regimes that have consolidated their monopoly on the instruments of the state face little possibility of violent challenge, almost by definition, although such a capacity can only be observed indirectly by looking at measures such as GDP per capita or indexes of governments' ability to extract resources from their populations.[4]

Empirical studies revealing variables correlated to the onset of civil conflict can be useful, because they point to general risk factors for civil war, many

[3] For the datasets and models of civil war onset upon which this essay primarily draws, see Collier & Hoeffler (2001); Elbadawi & Sambanis (2002); Fearon & Laitin (2001); Hegre et al. (2001).

[4] Collier et al. (2003: 58) find that doubling per capita income approximately halves the risk of civil war onset, and Fearon & Laitin (2001: 83) find that, other factors being equal, nations in the bottom tenth percentile of per capita income worldwide have a 18% chance of civil war outbreak in a given year, compared to 11% for a median-income country and just 1% for a nation in the 90th percentile.

of which policymakers have levers available to change. As in public health, it is possible to set guidelines and targets for 'lower risk' behaviors, even if the exact pathway of the disease of civil violence remains to be described. Here, one important finding is that civil conflict is a problem not only of security but also of development, with the poorest countries by far the most likely to fall into violence. Efforts to promote development in the regions that have fallen farthest behind global economic growth are thus one of the most important mechanisms available to prevent conflict (Stewart & Fitzgerald, 2000). To take another example, the role of diasporas in conflict suggests that efforts to better regulate international financial transfers may help to curb not only international networks of criminals, terrorists, and arms and drugs dealers, but also interrupt funding of civil violence.

What We Have To Figure Out

There are significant areas of consensus relating to civil conflict, but researchers maintain a number of diverse theories and findings regarding some of the political factors most often cited in the public debate on internal violence: democracy or democratization, natural resources, and the role of inequality and ethnicity.

The Role of Democracy

During the 1990s, the world both celebrated a series of democratic transitions in post-communist and developing nations, and worried that new, weak democracies would prove more likely to fall into conflict under the pressures of ethnic rivalries, demagogue politics, and the hardships of simultaneous political and economic transitions. Models of the relationship between democracy and civil violence have had, however, neither consistent nor readily interpretable results. Findings have differed widely, but there is a modest pool of evidence for an inverted U-curve relationship, in which consolidated autocracies and consolidated democracies are least prone to war (Hegre et al., 2001). Yet, it is unclear what it really means to suggest that states between autocracy and democracy are most at risk for civil war, because it is difficult to differentiate between nations that truly mix democratic and autocratic features in a single political system (a condition sometimes called 'anocracy'), those that are passing through eras of political instability and transformation, and those that are simply weak states where would-be authoritarians cannot quite destroy the opposition. Thus, when researchers find disproportionate numbers of civil wars in anocracies, they are looking at some nations in which the government is democratizing or lies

along a continuum of regime characteristics somewhere between democracy and autocracy, but also at cases in which the signal characteristic is tenuous or absent regime control. Civil war may have less to do with type of regime arrangements than with stable regime arrangements.

Such research findings are sufficient, however, to call into question the oft-cited notion that the spread of democratic transitions worldwide since the end of the Cold War is the primary culprit of today's civil violence (Zakaria, 2003; Snyder, 2000). Conflict in 'democratizing' nations may be primarily driven by the fact that the regimes are simply unstable, factional, or have lost the repressive capacities of full autocracies. In fact, some models find that transitions in the direction of autocracy are associated with risks of conflict that are similar to or worse than those found in transitions to democracy. And while the number of nations enjoying political openness has generally increased since the end of the Cold War, most political scientists – in some contrast to the prevailing conventional wisdom – believe that rates of civil conflict have fallen since that time. Certainly, the widespread trend toward democratization in the early 1990s has not caused the historically unprecedented pandemic of civil violence that is sometimes portrayed in the media.

And yet, is it not worrying that is it so difficult to find clear evidence that power-sharing and just government allow for nonviolent resolution of civil disputes? One possible explanation is that civil war and democracy have existed together primarily in relatively poor democracies, for example the Kurdish rebellion in Turkey during the 1990s or separatist violence in Indonesia. Perhaps the benefits of democracy are enjoyed only above a certain income threshold (Hegre, 2003). Empirically, it is true that there is virtually no incidence of civil war in wealthy, fully consolidated democracies, while even highly consolidated and rich autocracies have been seen to collapse into civil violence. And although a democracy may be able to effectively channel and address broad popular grievances, this does not offer certain protection against fringe groups whose truly radical demands cannot be incorporated into a liberal political system; for example, Japan's democracy and wealth did not insure it against Aum Shinrikyo, the apocalyptic cult that attacked the Tokyo subway system with sarin gas in 1995.

Thus far, models of conflict onset have not revealed what, if any, mechanisms of democracy offer states protection against civil war. Many researchers test the relationship between conflict and regime type by asking if nations with freely elected regimes are at less risk of civil conflict. But it may be that other features of liberal governance are more important in preventing conflict, such as political protections and civil liberties, or the ability to peacefully change the distribution of resources among groups. The understanding of regime and internal conflict can be improved both by developing more nuanced macro-level tests and by conducting regional, local, and comparative

studies that trace the importance of particular features of governance or attempt to account for certain cases of failure or success.

Such a careful analysis of the governance mechanisms that link regime type to the risk of civil violence is of great importance for policymakers. Western aid is frequently focused on the support of democratization, governance reform, and civil society. These instruments of foreign policy should be designed and sequenced with attention paid to preventing civil violence. Even more pressing, international post-conflict interventions now take it as a fundamental (if not always practical) principle that a period of strengthening democratic institutions is desirable in place of a rush to hold elections. But, given the reality of limited time and resources, which institutions can be most effectively revitalized to prevent a return to war?

Natural Resource Dependency: Incentives Versus Opportunities

The role of natural resources and commodities trade in civil war has recently received great attention. Under the provocative headline of a debate on 'greed' versus 'grievance', rebel movements have been increasingly portrayed as fundamentally apolitical, motivated only by profits from black-market goods, such as West African diamonds, Cambodian timber, and Afghan poppies (Berdal & Malone, 2000; Collier, 2000; Grossman, 1999; Keen, 1998).

Plausible theories can easily be sketched for a relationship between natural resources (either their presence or the degree of overall natural-resource dependence in an economy) and both the motivation and the opportunity for civil war. However, imprecise measures of commodity trade and resources and the paucity of available data for these measures have made it difficult to distinguish which of these links is most important in practice (Ross, 2004). For example, resource dependence may play a role in conflict onset by increasing the spoils that a successful takeover of the national government promises. Concentrated natural resources may similarly provide an incentive for regional separatism. Resource-dependent regimes also tend to display particular characteristics in terms of taxation, corruption and rent-seeking behavior, and degree of political openness (Bates & Lien, 1985; Ross, 2001). Such regimes may grow increasingly disengaged from the provision of public services and promotion of dynamic economic growth, dependent on a narrow group of spoils-seekers for power, and thus highly vulnerable to contest, especially in a moment of crisis after a shock to commodity prices. Dependence on oil and fuel exports – industries easily monopolized and nationalized, where looting or diverting the commodity would require highly sophisticated technology and infrastructure – tends to be particularly likely to create a weak, limited government. Finally, the availability of resources may play a role as a source of finance for conflict, for both the state

and rebels, especially if combatants can sell not just actual resources but also future rights to resources of which they expect to take control, as was observed during civil war in Sierra Leone. Such funding may also be increasingly important owing to the end of Cold War levels of military assistance. Illegal drug production and trafficking is also a highly flexible source of financing for prolonging conflict and thrives in weak states, and some studies have found a persistent relationship between opium production and conflict (Regan & Aydin, 2003; Regan & Norton, 2003).

A growing number of researchers now feel that the role of natural resources in providing funding for conflict is probably more significant than its role in motivating conflict (Collier et al., 2003: 79). Opportunity may be more important than either greed or grievance. A global test of such a theory is stymied in part by the problems of measuring the financing available to governments and rebels. But evidence from individual case studies has made it clear that one cannot simply assume a relationship when combat and natural resources are present in the same nation. For example, civil conflict in Mali has not been based in the regions of the country that are important to the gold industry, and in South Africa diamonds were not an important mechanism in apartheid-era insurgencies (Sambanis, 2003a).

In fact, despite the media attention paid to the subject, research has thus far not found that nations with significant diamond resources are at higher risk for conflict onset, even when only alluvial diamonds (the lootable sort found in riverbeds rather than deep in mines) are considered (Lujala, Gleditsch & Gilmore, 2003). This finding suggests that lootable resources enable conflicts to continue more often than they provide the primary impetus for such violence. On the other hand, given that there are only about 20 countries worldwide with significant diamond endowments, and just 10–15 more with smaller deposits, the failure to find a correlation with conflict onset worldwide is not so surprising. And it does not mean that diamonds are not important when a civil war is occurring around them. Micro-level study can be used to more fully understand the role gems and other resources have played in motivating and enabling such conflicts (e.g. Samset, 2002).

Relationships Between Groups: Ethnicity and Inequality

It is a common assumption that ethnic tensions and related social inequities are driving factors in civil wars, especially since the decline of communist ideologies. However, global conflict models have not uncovered clear evidence of such a conclusion. Possibly, this is because researchers have been asking the question in slightly the wrong way. Many studies have failed to find a relationship between conflict and measures of inequality designed to capture the total spread of income within a country, from the richest to the poorest. Attention to such measures and the theories of class-based

conflict they can be used to test were of particular interest in the Cold War environment. However, in the theoretical literature there is increasing agreement that the most dangerous demographic makeup for a nation is better described as the phenomenon of polarization, in which the majority (ethnic, lingual, cultural, and/or religious) faces a minority nearly as large (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2003; Reynal-Querol, 2002), especially if economic classes tend to run along the same lines. Presumably more benign is the situation in which cultural and class divisions 'crisscross', so that there are relatively numerous poor and rich members within all cultural groups. This tends to reduce those groups' internal cohesion and should give at least some individuals from all factions a stake in preserving the normal functioning of the economy. The challenge for researchers is to find better ways to describe social composition, and to investigate the possibility that horizontal, or inter-group, inequalities cause civil conflicts (Stewart, 2001).

While good statistical measures of horizontal equality are still lacking, country-level studies have already made it clear that the role of disparity in civil war is not simple or even consistent. Consider the contrasting cases of Nepal and Indonesia. In Nepal, a civil war began in 1996 after Maoists were barred from contesting elections. This is a society of great horizontal inequality between castes, and these disparities also have ethnic and regional dimensions. Recently, empirical research has demonstrated that regions with higher intensities of violence (a proxy for areas of rebel activity and support) are also those areas that are the poorest and have the highest rates of landlessness (Murshed & Gates, 2003). On the other hand, the Indonesian separatist regions of Aceh, Papua (Irian Jaya), Riau, and East Kalimantan each have higher GDP per capita than the Indonesian nation as a whole. Government expenditure per capita in these regions is, however, no higher than average, reflecting nationwide programs of income redistribution. This may suggest that the regions want to secede in part to maintain control of the relatively great wealth being generated in their areas (Tadjoeddin, 2003). The contrast between patterns of horizontal inequality in Nepal and Indonesia has been called the contrast between the rage of the poor and the rage of the rich. Both the advantaged and the disadvantaged may have incentives to engage in conflict, and the mechanisms by which inequality causes conflict likely differ significantly by region and by country, according to historical factors in intergroup relationships and broader economic and political structures.

Tools for Scholarship

The task of analyzing important and controversial issues related to civil violence begins with the task of learning more about such conflicts. The

difficulty of gathering the relevant information is, however, readily apparent: a civil war zone is hardly transparent and may be totally inaccessible to outsiders. Countries of interest are usually poor and lack sophisticated government, NGO, media, or research apparatus to gather and store data. And, in many cases, such resources that do exist are likely to collapse further during conflict. All parties to the conflict have obvious incentives to distort information, and researchers are particularly interested in learning more about politically sensitive topics such as regime behavior, natural-resource corruption, demographic polarization, and income inequality. Other areas of interest are not just sensitive but concealed as a matter of course: for example, the amount of illicit financing a rebel group has received or the number of times a regime has resorted to political manipulation or human rights abuse.

Most often, information comes to the researcher from journalistic sources, which present their own set of problems. Many sources are advocacy-oriented or alarmist, but they are also often simply imprecise, being intended to convey a broad depiction of the conflict, not to be gleaned for scientific measurements. Reporters use vague words such as 'many' or 'scores' to refer, for example, to casualty levels, or make unspecific references to times, locations, and chains of events. More critically, conflicts in countries not on the Western media agenda are difficult to monitor, or even identify. One result may be that the universe of knowledge about conflict is disproportionately driven by the high volume of facts coming out of areas with intense media coverage, like Israel–Palestine and Kashmir, while virtually nothing is being documented on conflicts such as that in the Cabinda region of Angola or the persistent ethnic violence in Ethiopia. This problem may be even more serious as researchers attempt to extend their comparisons back through time.

Compared to the study of civil war, scholarship on international conflict is able to draw on far more nuanced data. Researchers can monitor the ongoing relationships among states and the behaviors that signal interstate conflict and disagreement but may never develop into war or even lead to a single death. There are sophisticated databases compiled on formal diplomatic relations, treaties and trade relationships, alliances, sanctions regimes, and shows of military force, for example. Researchers of civil violence face challenges in duplicating such nuanced records. While interstate disputes are by definition only possible among a defined set of actors, the occurrence or non-occurrence of civil conflict (as well as colonial war and international terrorism) depends on the decisions of an ever-changing set of organizations, many of whom are clandestine or whose existence is officially denied. Thus, while monitoring interstate violence through standard media channels (which tend to be most complete in their coverage of governments and other official bodies) may be largely accurate, studies of civil conflict can derive

great benefits from conducting fieldwork and accessing informal or local channels of knowledge.

One avenue for gathering reliable data and confirming the accuracy of sources that is notably not available to researchers is that of international institutions. No international institution gathers and produces information on the incidence and impact of internal conflict in the way that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund gather economic figures. This is, no doubt, in large part because of the controversy such reporting would generate: the United Nations has avoided such a project, and the World Bank has dealt with conflict only by dealing with civil war as a development issue. At the World Health Organization, researching deaths through civil violence has historically slipped between the institutional cracks, as war deaths are usually not picked up by a nation's vital registration, the source of most WHO data on causes of death, or may be purposely obscured by classification as homicides or accidents.[5]

Data availability is one problem, data interpretation another. A study of civil war, on the macro or micro level, begins with an attempt to identify certain events as belonging to one or more such conflicts. Immediately, there are definitional dilemmas. The researcher must make decisions about who the relevant actors in a civil war are, whether civil wars imply a certain amount of violence, when the war can be said to have begun and ended, and what makes a conflict civil instead of international (Sambanis, 2003b). For example, civil wars are usually assumed to occur between relatively organized groups, one of which is the government of a state. Yet, Somalia is considered to have been in a state of civil war throughout the 1990s, long after it lacked either a recognized government or an organized rebel resistance. After 1994, Rwandan Interahamwe rebels struck at the Tutsi government from refugee camps in the Democratic Republic of Congo, actions widely interpreted as part of the Rwandan civil war. Yet, it is difficult to tell if similar operations by Hezbollah and by Palestinian resistance movements within Lebanon against Israel are part of a civil war, an international war, a colonial war, or all of those at once. Finally, distinguishing and studying the relationship between civil war and one-sided violence is also difficult. War is contested through violence on at least two sides, yet wars can include pogroms, reprisal killings of civilians, banditry, and even genocide. Theoretical frameworks for research must aid in gathering information on diverse events without either omitting key facts through overly narrow definitions or including so broad a range of events as to obscure all patterns.[6]

[5] Research also suggests that violent deaths are often not the most important impact on human health as the result of a civil war, especially over time. War-driven disease may be especially important for understanding the importance of war in terms of the magnitude of the threat it poses to global health (Ghobarah, Huth & Russett, 2003).

[6] One recent attempt to address this need is the Uppsala University/PRIO dataset on armed conflicts, which sets a low threshold of 25 fatalities per year as sufficient to record the presence of a civil conflict (see

Tools for Policy

Ironically, civil conflict has received frenzied media attention and more extensive scholarly focus in recent years not because it has emerged on an unprecedented scope but, in part, simply because it is no longer sharing the stage with the superpower rivalry. The post-Cold War interest in internal conflict is, in many ways, a recognition of the import and uniqueness of local dynamics of civil violence and a correction of the tendency to categorize conflicts solely according to their relationship to the US–Soviet rivalry. Research into such dynamics has uncovered findings that need to be clarified and communicated to policymakers. The clearest of these is that civil war primarily occurs in weak states – nations that are poor, have limited state structures, and whose regimes have neither a consolidated authoritarian grip on all instruments of power nor a mature democratic compact that guarantees power-sharing, protection for citizens, and nonviolent recourse for grievances. Conflict also begets conflict, and the world has seen a group of states dissolve into viciously circular riddles of poverty, repression, and violence. Internal violence will persist in those regions that fail to advance in terms of economic development and political stability, and, thus, the global security regime must orient itself to face threats emerging from conflict zones in the periphery. The frequency and severity of such threats depends to a great extent on how large the periphery is allowed to remain, as well as on the provision of effective support for conflict prevention and resolution and post-conflict rebuilding processes.

Also, though the Cold War paradigm of proxy wars may have faded, civil conflict remains undeniably linked to and shaped by the international system. The nations that are most at risk for these conflicts are poor and look to international donors and Western governments for a variety of diplomatic, economic, and military resources. Those who seek to curb civil conflict must use such ties to support nations in economic development, long-term political stability, and achieving workable civil compromise. Conflict itself also looks abroad for resources. As economies grind to a halt, governments and rebel groups fund themselves through the international sale of natural resources, as well as black-market traffic in drugs and other goods and repatriations of foreign exchange from citizens living abroad. Combatants are armed thanks to the international trade in weaponry and to external military aid. It is impossible to entirely control the flows of such

Eriksson, Wallensteen & Sollenberg, 2003; Gleditsch et al., 2002). Other researchers have moved towards attempts to categorize prevailing levels of political violence in a nation along a continuum (Cornett & Gibney, 2003; Poe, Tate & Keith, 1999; State Failure Task Force, 2003), or look not to the absolute level but to the sustainability of violence (Schreiber, 2003). The Centre for Human Security at the Liu Institute for Global Issues of the University of British Columbia tracks violence according to state-based civil conflict as well as intracommunal and one-sided violence (Mack, 2004).

resources, but markets can be regulated and illicit sources of assistance can be slowed.

International actors will and should continue to assist with mediation and negotiation, ceasefire monitoring, disarmament, and post-conflict rebuilding in situations of civil violence. There should also be cognizance of the fact that many of the most promising steps towards civil peace have been regional initiatives, perhaps the signal example being the success of the Organization of American States and the leadership of Costa Rica in helping to bring Central America out of decades of violence. Yet, neither policymakers nor scholars can point to a ready exit from the labyrinth of recurrent conflict; far more research has been done on conflict onset than on the duration or termination of conflict.

The international community has already confronted the enormous task of assisting nations to construct peaceful political systems, even as past conflicts continue to bleed nations and regions through legacies of poverty, disease, militarization, and the collapse of both physical and social infrastructure. Above all, serious efforts to prevent and curb civil conflict will require that international institutions, NGOs, and foreign governments adopt long time-horizons. In a world of limited resources, however, more must be done to answer the questions of where and how outsiders can best support those who seek to bring their nations toward civil peace.

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