

Military losses and public support for domestic counterinsurgency

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Abstract

When does the public support domestic counterinsurgency? Do military casualties decrease support for fighting, as documented during overseas wars? I argue that out-of-theater populations are sensitive to civil war costs and increase support for policy compromise in response to military losses. Evidence comes from a 2010 survey regarding war in southern Thailand. That conflict had features common to most civil wars: asymmetric combat, an isolated military theater, and insurgents with limited popular appeal. Combining information on the Royal Thai Army's draft and deployments, I show that army fatalities from a respondent's area predict support for southern autonomy as a means of ending insurgency. Army fatalities do not explain support for compromise in an unrelated conflict in Bangkok. Respondents' subjective assessments of the toll of southern insurgency also predict support for autonomy. This is the first study to show military losses depress public support for counterinsurgency in a contemporary civil war.

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When does the public support domestic counterinsurgency (COIN)? Do the costs of internal war prompt citizens to back government compromise? Both scholars and policymakers believe that military losses in overseas wars undermine popular support for fighting. This “casualty sensitivity” pattern has been extensively studied in the United States and Europe. Does a comparable process influence public opinion during domestic conflicts?

I argue that support for domestic counterinsurgency declines in the face of conflict costs, particularly military fatalities, in asymmetric civil conflicts where most civilians have no firsthand exposure to violence. Contrary to conventional wisdom, most internal conflicts fit that description. Particularly in medium-to-large military powers, internal wars unfold in isolated theaters. For example, since 1950, China, India, Turkey, South Africa, Mexico, Russia, Algeria, Indonesia, and Pakistan have all fought wars confined to a relatively small area and posing no immediate threat to most civilians. When trying to understand public support for COIN against that type of insurgency, the analogy to overseas war is useful. I expect that, as in overseas war, government losses erode support for war.

To make that case, I investigate support for domestic counterinsurgency in southern Thailand in 2010. Based on the recruitment practices and deployment history of the Royal Thai Army (RTA), I determine the home regions of army soldiers killed in the south. I use public opinion data from The Asia Foundation to show that a larger number of army fatalities from a respondent’s area increased the probability of supporting southern autonomy as a means of ending war in the south. To bolster this evidence, I create a placebo test, showing that army fatalities in the south do not correlate with support for political compromise in an unrelated conflict in Bangkok. I also find that Thais who rated the conflict in the south as a particularly serious problem for the country supported greater southern autonomy.

To my knowledge, the only quantitative study of government military casualties and support for domestic counterinsurgency is based on the American Civil War. This is the first article to show a relationship between government military losses and support for policy compromise during a contemporary war. Unlike many other investigations of public opinion in civil war, I do not focus

on personal experiences of violence as an independent variable. My dependent variable is support for specific government policies, instead of affinity for insurgents or out-group tolerance.

The focus on Thailand also provides a fruitful contrast to the cases that dominate the study of public opinion in civil war. That research is drawn disproportionately from atypical conflicts: non-separatist wars, militarily symmetric wars, and wars in from physically small countries,¹ or failed states. Public opinion studies are often done in concert with a large Western presence in post-conflict reconstruction (e.g., Burundi) or COIN (e.g., Afghanistan). The war in Thailand fits the more common profile of a civil war that is asymmetric, separatist, and regionally-confined, with a minor role for Western military advisors and aid agencies. This profile is particularly typical of civil war in medium and large military powers, including such geopolitically significant countries such as Turkey, Russia, and China. The evidence from Thailand suggests that understanding how asymmetric civil conflicts escalate, persist, and terminate can be enhanced by integrating the study of public opinion in overseas and civil wars.

Government losses and public support for war

During overseas war, total military casualties, adverse trends in casualties, and individuals' social and spatial proximity to casualties all depress support for military operations.² Scholars depict civilians weighing the costs and benefits of conflict (Gartner, 2008; Koch and Nicholson, 2016; Mueller, 1973):

Actual or “objective” information regarding the costs and benefits of war is carefully

¹The studies cited below represent Afghanistan, Burundi, Israel/Palestine, Pakistan, the Caucasus region in Russia, Nepal, Sierra Leone, and Uganda. The median physical size of these countries is 190,000 square kilometers, compared to the median of 670,000 sq. km for all civil war countries since 1989 (GADM, 2012; Sundberg and Melander, 2013). Thailand is about 510,000 sq. km.

²The bulk of the evidence for these claims comes from the US. Some of the studies below were conducted with data from Great Britain or Western Europe.

weighed by an individual before he or she forms attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the war, the long-term prospects for success, the worthiness of the goals of the intervention (Boettcher and Cobb, 2006, 838).

The cost/benefit calculations are nuanced in multiple ways. Some people place such a low or high value on the outcome of the conflict that new information about costs cannot shift their views. Individual cost or casualty sensitivity can also vary, with support for fighting decaying very rapidly or only slowly (Gelpi et al., 2009). Objective information is filtered through individual biases and frames (Althaus et al., 2012; Gaines et al., 2007; Johnson and Tierney, 2006), as well as cues from elected officials and the media (Baum and Groeling, 2010; Berinsky, 2007; Jakobsen and Ringsmose, 2015; Pevehouse and Howell, 2007). Scholars also theorize more or less complicated cost/benefit calculations. For example, individuals might use casualties to update their beliefs about the likely ultimate success of war, as well as keeping a running tally of war costs (Eichenberg, 2005; Gelpi et al., 2009). Boettcher and Cobb (2006) argue that enemy casualties function as a “yardstick” for judgements about whether own side casualties are high or low.

Individual support for war also varies according to differences in social proximity to soldiers killed in war. Civilians respond most to costs befalling their families and acquaintances (Davenport, 2015). Spatial proximity to families of the deceased also matters. “A respondent cannot help but weight proximate experiences more heavily, if for no other reason than this information is both salient and readily accessible” via both media channels and informal information networks within communities (Gartner et al., 1997, 674). US individuals living closer to the families of fallen soldiers were less likely to support the Vietnam War (Gartner and Segura, 2000) and the second Iraq war (Althaus et al., 2012; Hayes and Myers, 2009). In US elections, voter punishment of incumbents’ support for war is conditioned by local casualties rather than total casualties (Gartner et al., 2004; Grose and Oppenheimer, 2007; Karol and Miguel, 2007; Kriner and Shen, 2007).

Casualty sensitivity in civil war?

In civil war, do government losses reduce public support for war? In the sole large-n study to examine military losses and political behavior during civil war, Carson et al. (2001) examine Congressional races during the US Civil War. Incumbents lost more votes in districts with more local casualties, consistent with government losses decreasing support for the war effort. This study is the exception, however, as studies of public opinion in civil war rarely focus on military deaths.

Instead, scholarship focuses on the effects of experiencing civil war violence firsthand. Multiple studies of public opinion in Israel and Palestine imply that people are more opposed to negotiation and policy compromise after they are injured in violent events and after violence near their home communities (Berrebi and Klor, 2008; Canetti-Nisim et al., 2017, 2009; Maoz and McCauley, 2009; Shayo and Zussman, 2011). These findings suggest firsthand violent experiences are radicalizing. We do not know whether that pattern is generalizable beyond Israel/Palestine. In studies of Pakistan and Afghanistan, personal experience of violence has ambiguous effects on policy views, thanks to the role of other predispositions and beliefs (Blair et al., 2013; Lyall et al., 2013). Trauma has remarkably complex consequences for longterm and post-war political behavior.³

How does war change the views of those who do not experience violence firsthand? Two studies find anti-social attitudes are unusually prevalent in post-conflict countries. Tir and Singh (2015) show social intolerance is higher after secessionist wars. These higher levels of intolerance apply against all out-groups and not only against those on the opposite side of the recent civil war. Hutchison (2014) uses crossnational data to show that civil conflict reduces public support for civil liberties of non-conformist organizations. These findings are intriguing but do not address willingness to sustain counterinsurgency while conflict is still ongoing.

³Bakke et al. (2009); Bellows and Miguel (2009); Blattman (2009); Canetti-Nisim et al. (2009); De Juan and Pierskalla (2016); Gutiérrez-Romero (2014); Hong and Kang (2017); Voors et al. (2012).

In sum, in the study of public opinion and civil war, the independent variable of interest is usually personal experience of violence. The dependent variable is sometimes support for government policy change but scholars also consider affinity for insurgents and longterm changes in sociability. Thus, there is little evidence on whether government losses undermine public support for domestic counterinsurgency. I argue this dynamic does prevail among out-of-theater civilians during asymmetric civil wars.

Linking war costs and support for domestic counterinsurgency

An overseas war is a plausible analogy for an asymmetric civil war from the point-of-view of the out-of-theater population. Three similarities between overseas and asymmetric internal conflict bear this out. First, the threat to the government is not existential. Admittedly, asymmetric civil wars are not usually initiated by the government, as overseas conflicts often are. But as in overseas conflicts, a government in an asymmetric internal war can concede the fight without ceasing to exist, for example by implementing policies demanded by the insurgents. In fact, most civil wars end when the government defeats the rebels, implements policies that undermine rebel recruiting, or negotiates policy concessions in exchange for rebel disarmament (Kreutz, 2010).

Second, insurgents are spatially isolated. Most civil wars only directly involve a small portion of a country's population and territory. This is true of secessionist wars, which comprise more than half of all civil wars. Even non-secessionist wars are usually geographically confined (Dittrich Hallberg, 2012). Leftist guerrillas have been confined to upland and rural areas in India, Colombia, the Philippines, and Guatemala. Religious militants in Algeria fought in the rural hinterland. In Nigeria, militant Islamists are regionally based. In all these cases, the war theater may not be overseas but it is also not accessible to most civilians. Spatial isolation encourages the public to see the conflict as non-existential and influences how civilians experience war costs. The threat to civilians in their daily lives is minimal. Civilians exposure to the costs of violence is primarily through ties to people in the conflict theater, often soldiers and government personnel deployed for the purpose of COIN.

Third, insurgent organizations are frequently socially isolated, making narrow appeals and operating clandestinely. Some causes, such as ethnic appeals, imply bounds on the insurgents' civilian constituency. Whether they appeal to ethnicity or not, insurgents recruit clandestinely within pre-existing, tightly-knit social networks, like clans, secret societies, churches, and neighborhoods (Staniland, 2012, 148–9). Most people will never meet an insurgent or be asked to support the cause. In fact, most would have no point of entry if they were so inclined. A useful analogy is a crime syndicate in the United States. Most people in the US cannot readily contact these organizations, let alone help or join them.

The spatial and social isolation of insurgents, combined with the non-existential stakes of the conflict, influence the parameters of public debate. In an overseas conflict the range of public opinion is between hawks and doves. Only rarely does someone defect or become a foreign agent. Similarly, for most people during asymmetric civil war, there is no question of whether to support the insurgents or the government. Rather, the public debates how coercive or conciliatory government policy should be.

Asymmetric COIN and overseas war share several characteristics from the point-of-view of civilians outside the conflict theater: non-existential stakes, limited civilian exposure to risk, and conflict costs that befall soldiers and government personnel serving in a far-off fight. When these parallels hold, I expect that the model of public opinion developed for overseas wars is a good approximation of public opinion regarding domestic COIN. Civilians out-of-theater compare the costs of continued fighting to the costs of offering generous terms of settlement in hope of peace. The costs of fighting reduce the out-of-theater population's backing for military action and increase support for government policy concessions to end conflict. Greater social and spatial proximity to soldiers killed in domestic COIN will translate into less support for continued COIN operations.

My context for evaluating these claims is public opinion about ethnic war in southern Thailand. The next section explains that conflict.

Pattani Malay insurgency in Thailand

In the eighteenth century, the Thai kings moved to exert greater control over the ethnically Malay sultanate to the south, known as Patani (or Pattani or Tani) (Haemindra, 1976, 198-203). Until 1906, these areas of contemporary Thailand had a semi-autonomous, vassal status. Today, the sultanate's territory makes up Thailand's southern provinces of Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani, as well as some border areas in Songkhla province (see Figure 1).⁴ About 80% of the population there speaks Pattani-Malay (also called Yawa) as a first language instead of Thai. Almost all Pattani-Malays are Muslims, while Thailand as a whole is 90% Buddhist.

In the twentieth century, there were multiple episodes of mobilization in southern Thailand around the issues of autonomy and cultural recognition. Separatist militants were active in the 1960s and 1970s. Some of those organizations survived, underground but militarily inactive, through the 1990s. Pro-autonomy movements invoke the regional Pattani-Malay identity rather than religion or language per se. There are Thai- and Chinese-ethnicity Muslims in southern Thailand, but the insurgency exclusively recruits Pattani-Malay Muslims. Similarly, the insurgents have no presence among Malay speakers in areas of Thailand that were not parts of the Patani sultanate (Funston, 2008, xiii).

A new generation of separatist outfits began to attack government officials and civilians in the south in the early 2000s. These fighters were fractionalized and initially did not make clear policy demands. No public leadership could credibly claim to be directing the violence (Funston, 2008; Liow and Pathan, 2010). Nonetheless, approximately 6,500 people have been killed in the fighting (Engvall and Srisompob, 2016). By 2010, about 20,000 RTA soldiers had been deployed to the south (ICG, 2010, 3) and over 600 government personnel had been killed there (Sundberg and Melander, 2013). That number killed is, by some standards, modest. However, studies of overseas war suggest that small numbers of casualties can have dramatic impacts on public opinion (Larson, 1996). For example, Thai government losses in the south were an order of magnitude larger than

⁴Figure 1 based on GADM (2012); National Statistical Office (2010).

Figure 1: Thailand’s four census/military draft regions—north, northeastern, central and southern—and its southernmost provinces circa 2007–2010



US deaths during the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu (a.k.a., “Black Hawk Down”), a paradigmatic case of public casualty sensitivity.

Power Vacuum

The insurgency surged in the early 2000s thanks to a power vacuum inadvertently created by Thaksin Shinawatra, Thailand’s elected prime minister between 2001 and 2006 (Mahakanjana, 2006; McCargo, 2008). Thaksin saw southern Thailand as a stronghold for his political opponents and set himself the goal of replacing key officials and politicians there with allies and loyalists.

Thaksin reorganized the central administration of the south. Most notably, he transferred responsibility for security from the military to the national police. During the handover, a large number of government informants inside the separatist underground were killed. As for local government, Thailand is a unitary state with unelected provincial authorities.⁵ In the south, these were supplemented by two unelected bodies coordinating central military and civilian administra-

⁵The exceptions are Bangkok and Pattaya City, both in central Thailand.

tion: the Southern Border Administration Center (SBPAC) and Civil-Military-Police Task Force 43 (CMP-43) (Funston, 2008, 25). Neither the SBPAC nor CMP-43 provided regional political autonomy, but they did serve as a means for central officials to consult with and coopt Pattani Malay elites (Mahakanjana, 2006). Thaksin dissolved both the SBPAC and CMP-43, disrupting that *modus vivendi*.

Finally, to gain an electoral following in the south, Thaksin reached out to the largest Pattani Malay political party, called Wadah (“Unity”). In 2002, Wadah joined Thaksin’s party and Wadah’s leader became the interior minister. Alignment with Thaksin undermined Wadah’s popularity by implicating it in central repression. Like the other pieces of Thaksin’s strategy to gain a following in southern Thailand, the Wadah alliance undermined powerful pro-status quo actors, creating an opening for insurgency.

Isolated conflict

Thailand’s southern insurgency is an example of a domestic insurgency that resembles an overseas war from the perspective of many civilians. The threat is not existential in any literal sense. “A majority of the population . . . is largely oblivious to the ongoing conflict” Albritton (2006, 172). “Even within Thailand, the south rarely figures as a major news story. . . . For many Thais . . . the southern conflict resembles a side show rather than a struggle for the soul of Thailand” (McCargo, 2012, 4). Fighting is spatially isolated. There is little threat of violence to civilians out of theater. As we will see below, civilians feel the costs of war primarily because of the military draft. The insurgency is also socially isolated. It draws from a regional group that is defined so that even some colinguists and coreligionists do not qualify. These circumstances suggest an analogy to overseas war.

I expect that out-of-theater Thais with more exposure to government losses there will be less supportive of hardline policies in the south. The next two sections describe data on Thai public opinion regarding COIN in the south and a research design for relating those views to military losses.

Bangkok's counterinsurgency and public opinion

The dependent variable of interest in this study is the Thai public's support for more or less coercive policies in the south. As insurgency in the south spiraled, a series of pro- and anti-Thaksin governments took power in Bangkok. All of these governments favored a primarily coercive response to southern unrest. Thaksin increased force deployments in the south and rejected any talk of political compromise (Albritton, 2006). In 2006 Thaksin lost power in a coup. The military government reestablished the SBPAC and a joint civil-military-police command for the south, but with greater military dominance of each (Funston, 2008, 25). New laws protected the military from prosecution for human rights violations. Two civilian central governments followed the military interregnum: a Thaksin-aligned government elected in 2007 and a anti-Thaksin Democrat Party government that took power in 2008 (Abuza, 2011; Dalpino, 2011). Both governments were preoccupied by protests in Bangkok and allowed the military to continue its COIN policies in the south with minimal oversight.

Every central administration between 2000 and 2010 steadfastly opposed autonomy for southern Thailand, even in limited forms such as an elected governor. Bangkok's resistance to autonomy was exemplified by a National Reconciliation Council (NRC) appointed in 2005:

Reporting in June 2006, [the NRC] made a series of modest proposals for improving the quality of justice, security, and governance in the deep South . . . The NRC's proposals were considered too progressive by most government officials but did not go nearly far enough for most Malay Muslims. The NRC refused to engage seriously with ideas of substantive decentralization . . . let alone any proposals for different forms of autonomy (McCargo, 2008, 10).

Gunaratna and Acharya (2013), hawkish analysts opposed to southern autonomy, admit that there was no political will in the capital to implement the NRC's recommendations. Powerful conservatives in the government immediately moved to quash the NRC's tangible suggestions, such as the recognition of Malay as a "working language" in the south (156–157).

How much support did the government’s hardline policy have? My evidence on public attitudes comes from an Asia Foundation survey conducted between September 17 and October 23, 2010 (Asia Foundation, 2011).⁶ Surveyors asked respondents: “Some have suggested that political decentralization or limited autonomy (but not territorial separation) might help resolve the long-term conflict in southern Thailand. Do you agree or disagree?”⁷ Respondents who agreed were deviating sharply from Bangkok’s counterinsurgency strategy.

I code these responses as a dummy variable for *Support for southern autonomy*. 63% of non-Pattani Malay respondents endorsed southern autonomy in response to this question, indicating substantial dissent from the central elites’ military-driven strategy. 75% of Pattani respondents endorsed autonomy as a means to end conflict. The survey results are consistent with other estimates that imply civilians nationally favored a less hardline strategy than the government in Bangkok adopted. A 2009 Asia Foundation survey found 48% support for autonomy among non-Pattani speakers (Meisburger, 2009, 50). Gunaratna and Acharya (2013) report two national surveys from 2005 in which a majority of respondents opposed martial law in the south and the punitive security

⁶Figure A.1 in the Supplemental Materials shows the surveyed provinces. Narathiwat, Pattani, Yala, and Bangkok provinces were designated for inclusion in the survey prior to further sampling. Investigators drew a random sample of the remaining provinces in the country, stratifying based on the four regions used in Thailand’s census (Figure 1): north, northeast, central, and south. Within provinces, an equal number of rural and urban respondents were sampled, except in Bangkok, which is entirely urban. Some villages in the three southern provinces were omitted from the sampling frame due to insecurity. See the summary statistics for weighted and unweighted data in Tables A.1–A.6. Throughout the analysis in the main text, I use survey weights and cluster observations by sampling strata when calculating standard errors. I report results based on unweighted and unclustered data in the Supplementary Materials (Tables A.7, A.8, A.14). All robustness checks are consistent with the results in the main text.

⁷The Asian Foundation translations of the full text of all survey questions are provided in the Supplementary Materials, pages 3–5.

zone system the government was implementing at the time (153).

Exposure to government losses

In the study of support for overseas war, the number of military deaths from a respondent's geographic jurisdiction is treated as a measure of exposure to the costs of war. For example, US public support for war varies with state and county-level fatalities.

Creating a similar research design in Thailand requires some ingenuity. There is data on government personnel killed in the south but not on where these people were originally from. However, each of Thailand's four army commands draws its membership primarily from a particular census region of Thailand. In October, 2007, each of the four commands was assigned to a different southern district. These two facts allow me to match army fatalities after October 2007 to the regional army that sustained the losses. Each regional army is, in turn, associated with a specific recruitment region in Thailand. Thus, for each survey respondent, I know which army's region they live in and that army's recent losses.

Characterizing respondents according to the army region in which they live is potentially problematic because there are important regional divides in Thai politics unrelated to southern conflict. My solution is to focus on survey respondents living at the borders of army recruitment regions. Respondents living at these borders are similarly situated in Thailand's regional politics except that the recruitment region borders effect information about and salience of RTA losses in the south.

Note that there were no Pattani Malay respondents in these six provinces. My sample is made up of civilians likely to conform to earlier generalizations about out-of-theater civilians during asymmetric war. From the perspective of these respondents, the insurgents are spatially and socially far away. The stakes of the conflict are not existential. These respondents may support or oppose Bangkok's counterinsurgency policies but they are not in the pool of potential recruits for the rebels.

The remainder of this section justifies my research design in more detail, discussing RTA recruitment, deployment history, and the sample of respondents near RTA command borders.

RTA commands and conscription

In Thailand males ages 21 to 30 are required to participate in an annual draft lottery for two year terms in the military. Volunteering for the military can result in a shortened stint. Students may delay the draft for up to five years and affluent Thais can dodge enlistment through corruption. Gonwong et al. (2014) explain what happens to those who remain in the draft pool:

The RTA uses a lottery system to select $\approx 60,000$ young Thai men at the district level of their family residence for enlistment annually. The men enlisted comprise approximately 10% of young men at the district level in Thailand (1531).

About three-quarters of new recruits and draftees are assigned to the army. Before the war in the south escalated, assignment to the RTA did not carry much risk of actual war fighting. By 2010, about 20,000 Royal Thai Army (RTA) soldiers had been deployed to the south (ICG, 2010, 3). 60% of soldiers in the south were conscripts (McCargo, 2008, 102). Units were rotated out of the south on an annual basis, so the number of soldiers with past, current, or anticipated exposure to the southern conflict was even higher than these figures imply. The risk of deployment to the south slashed the count of volunteers for the RTA. In April 2005, the army reported it had 10,000 volunteers so far that year, compared to 30,000 to 40,000 by that point in previous years (Nanuam, 2005). These shortfalls only expanded the annual draft.

Based in part on the census region where they live (see Figure 1), recruits and conscripts are enrolled in one of the four commands of the RTA. The first army draws from the central region, the second from the northeast, the third from the north, and the fourth from the south, including the Pattani-majority provinces (Pimonpan, 2009). The correlation between recruits' area of origin and the regional army they join is not perfect but available data indicates it is very high, especially for conscripts.⁸ There is minimal migration between census regions in Thailand (ICG, 2010),

⁸McQueen et al. (1996) reported that 100% of the conscripts at the 3rd Army base in Phitsanuloke at the time of their study were from the northern region. However, in a study of the 1st Army's conscripts, Hatairat (2010) reported that the central region was overrepresented but so was

Table 1: Royal Thai Army fatalities and deployment of the Royal Thai Army by southern province

Province	RTA fatalities, 1/04–9/07	RTA command deployed 10/07	RTA Fatalities, 10/07–9/10 [†]
Narathiwat	32	1st (Central)	29
Pattani	29	2nd (Northeast)	14
Songkhla	1	4th (South)	0
Yala	35	3rd (North)	17

[†]Asia Foundation survey fielded in September, 2010.

reinforcing the regional character of each army.⁹

The RTA’s recruitment practices create a link between where someone lives in Thailand and the army command their neighbors and acquaintances are most likely to serve in. If a civilian is eligible for the draft or has friends and family eligible for the draft, their own risk of harm is tied to the losses befalling the regional command. When an RTA soldier in that command is killed, that information is particularly available and salient in the soldier’s home region. These facts imply that a civilian’s exposure to army losses differs according to the recruitment region the civilian lives in.

Army deployments, 2007–2010

In 2007, all four army commands were deployed to the south and assigned to particular districts. Before 2007, the 4th army took the lead in southern counterinsurgency. In October 2007, General Anupong took over command of southern military operations and reassigned the four RTA commands. The first army was put in charge of Narathiwat, the second was sent to Pattani, and the third to Yala. The fourth army was given responsibility for five districts in Songkhla province, marginalizing that command in future counterinsurgency, “a mark of Anupong’s displeasure at its the northeastern region (22–23).

⁹Government statistics from 2008 suggest less than 3% of Thais live outside the census region where they were born (National Statistical Office, 2009, Table 1).

ineffectiveness in tackling the violence” (ICG, 2008, 6).¹⁰

The 2007 redeployment of the four armies in the south makes it possible to match subsequent army fatalities to a regional army (see Table 1). To obtain data on army fatalities, I started from the geo-referenced Uppsala Conflict Data Project’s events data (Sundberg and Melander, 2013).¹¹ The data include references for the coders’ original sources for each incident reported. I retrieved these sources for all incidents in which government personnel were killed after October 2007 but before the Asia Foundation survey was fielded in September, 2010. Based on the original news reports, I separated army fatalities from deaths of other government personnel.¹² The borders of the RTA recruitment regions do not influence the salience of deaths among non-army personnel and civilians. They do manipulate the salience of RTA losses.

Respondents near the army command borders

Using this information on RTA recruitment and deployment, I can ask whether fatalities from a respondent’s regional army were correlated with support for southern autonomy. However, a serious objection to this research design is that Thai politics has salient regional cleavages unrelated to conflict in the south. How useful is it to compare respondents across draft areas given that geography matters in Thai politics for other reasons? To address this problem, I focus on six

¹⁰At the same time, Anupong announced a plan to recruit a new infantry division that would be drawn heavily from the three southernmost provinces. However, progress on recruiting and deploying that division was slow. At the end of 2010, soldiers in the south were overwhelmingly from elsewhere in Thailand (ICG, 2010, fn. 12).

¹¹Reports from Deep South Watch, an NGO in southern Thailand, imply UCDP may understate fatalities. For example, the Deep South Watch data record 3,471 total deaths between January 2004 and May 2009 (Srisompob, 2009). In the same period, UCDP estimates 2,244 deaths. Given UCDP’s sources, army fatalities are less likely to be under counted than militant or civilian deaths.

¹²Other personnel killed in the south include paramilitary rangers, police, civilian officials, local militias and a few marines. I do not know the communities of origin of these forces.

provinces located near the intersection of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd army regions (Figure 2).¹³ My sample of respondents comes from six provinces that lie in three different army regions but are clustered in the center of Thailand. Within this set of respondents, the borders of army regions made some RTA losses more significant than others.


Although there are regional tensions in Thai politics, the exact borders used here do not necessarily capture those tensions. The census/draft regions have no additional administrative role. Other national ministries use alternative regional definitions. All subnational government bodies are at the provincial level or below. The army regions are also not equivalent to political jurisdictions. In the 2007 elections, parliament was selected through (1) single member districts (SMD) nested within provinces and (2) seats rewarded proportionally based on election zones comprised of several provinces.¹⁴ The six provinces in my sample spanned three different election zones. Provinces that shared an army region did not necessarily share an election zone and vice versa. Figure 2 shows that in all six provinces the 2007 single-member races were mostly won by the pro-Thaksin party—the People’s Power Party (Phak Palang Prachachon) or PPP—or by one of the parties that joined the PPP government after the elections. The main party of opposition to Thaksin, the Democrat Party, was weak in all of these provinces.

Is there any danger of reverse causality? Could public opinion have determined RTA assignments in 2007? Perhaps armies from parts of the country relatively sympathetic to southern grievances were sent to more dangerous districts in an effort to win hearts and minds. If so, there might be a spurious positive relationship between more army fatalities and more support for southern autonomy. However, the 2007 deployments are inconsistent with that argument. The 1st army, from central Thailand, was assigned to Narathiwat, the deadliest province (Table 1). The 1st army

¹³None of the surveyed provinces were close to the border between the central and southern regions (Figure A.1). Of the provinces on the 1st–3rd regions’ borders, Lop Buri and Nakhon Ratchasima are potential outliers because they have important RTA bases. These two provinces can be dropped without overturning the results below (Table A.11).

¹⁴Election data from Carr (2016).

Figure 2: Survey districts on northern, northeastern, and central army region borders



Province	Army region	Election zone, 2007	Province SMD seats won by PPP, 2007	Province SMD seats in PPP coalition, 2007
Petchabun	3rd (N)	2	4 of 6 (66%)	5 of 6 (83%)
Khon Kaen	2nd (NE)	2	11 of 11 (100%)	11 of 11 (100%)
Nakhon Ratchasima	2nd (NE)	5	6 of 16 (38%)	16 of 16 (75%)
Lop Buri	1st (C)	2	3 of 5 (60%)	4 of 5 (80%)
Prachin Buri	1st (C)	5	2 of 3 (66%)	3 of 3 (100%)
Sing Buri	1st (C)	7	0 of 1 (0%)	1 of 1 (100%)

was considered the most professional and competent command (Pimonpan, 2009), so that assignment was tactically sensible. As for public opinion, central Thailand, compared to the north and northeast, was more friendly to the military and the Democrat Party and more inclined to support the central government's existing policy, *ceteris paribus*. Respondents in the central zone were also less likely to endorse greater local autonomy as a Thailand-wide reform (roughly 60% of respondents supporting) than respondents in the north (72%) or northeast (70%) (see the discussion of the decentralization survey question below). There is no reason to think central respondents were predisposed toward southern autonomy in the absence of conflict.

Regional army fatalities and support for southern autonomy

Thais living near the border of three Thai army draft regions were much more likely to support southern autonomy if their region's army had sustained more casualties. The evidence for that claim is in Table 2.

The table reports logistic regressions comparing army fatalities in a respondent's army region to support for southern autonomy.¹⁵ Model 1 is a bivariate regression of army fatalities and endorsement of southern autonomy. Army fatalities are positively signed and statistically significant. Figure 3 plots the predicted relationship. The horizontal axis is plotted from 14 to 29 army fatalities, the range observed in the data. Predicted support for southern autonomy, plotted on the vertical axis, grows as army fatalities accumulate. The likelihood of endorsing autonomy increases from 48% at 14 army fatalities to 82% at 29 fatalities.

Model 2 reevaluates this relationship controlling for other policy attitudes and respondent char-


¹⁵Table A.7 reestimates Table 2 without survey weights or clustered standard errors. Table A.8 clusters standard errors by province rather than by sampling strata. Table A.9 uses logged army fatalities as the independent variable. In order to estimate Models 1–4 on the same sample, I excluded respondents who answered the southern autonomy question but not the questions on central reconciliation used in Models 3–4 (see below). In the Supplementary Materials, I reestimate Models 1 and 2 using all respondents (Table A.10).

Table 2: Logistic regressions of respondent support for southern autonomy and for dropping charges against central protesters in districts at the boundaries of RTA recruitment regions

	Southern autonomy		Central political reconciliation	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Regional army fatalities	0.11* (0.021)	0.13* (0.028)	-0.040* (0.019)	-0.030 (0.020)
Favors decentralization		1.9* (0.33)		-0.57 (0.30)
Army role too large		-0.36 (0.37)		0.39 (0.31)
Satisfaction w national government		-0.47 (0.29)		-0.057 (0.23)
Age		-0.072 (0.081)		0.068 (0.066)
Female		0.096 (0.33)		-0.34 (0.29)
Secondary/Vocational		-0.54 (0.44)		-0.069 (0.36)
Bachelor's or higher		-1.8* (0.73)		0.15 (0.55)
Income		0.10 (0.093)		-0.14 (0.093)
Rural		-0.056 (0.30)		0.17 (0.27)
Sampling strata	6	6	6	6
Sample size	299	299	299	299

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$

Figure 3: RTA fatalities from a respondent’s army recruitment region and predicted probability of support for southern autonomy. Based on Model 1 (Table 2) and plotted with 95% confidence interval.



acteristics: age, sex, education, income, and ruralness.¹⁶ The controls for policy attitudes capture reasons to support autonomy or to oppose war that are distinct from the military costs of conflict but might be correlated with regional politics. First, respondents might have supported southern autonomy as a policy independent of its conflict-reducing potential. In 2010, nationwide decentralization was one of the political reforms being considered to resolve the crisis at the center. Respondents’ views on southern autonomy may have been informed by their overall support for decentralized governance. Model 2 indicates whether a respondent told the Asia Foundation s/he favored decentralization as a general principle (*Favors decentralization*). After an explanation of decentralization (see Supplementary Materials), respondents were asked “Which statement is closer to your point of view? (1) Better to decentralize to local government. Or (2) The central

¹⁶Age is a continuous scale ranging from 1 (18-19 years old) to 10 (Above 80 years old). Education is captured as dummy variables for secondary/vocational education and for post-secondary education. Income is a scale ranging from one to nine. Enumerators recorded the zero/one *Rural* variable. Table A.12 reestimates Models 2 and 4 controlling only for demographic characteristics.

government having the authority for decision making, as at present, would be more effective and efficient.” Respondents who chose the former option were coded as a one on the *Favors decentralization* indicator.

Some Thais probably viewed the conflict through the lens of their opinions about Thailand’s politicized military—recall that there was a coup in 2006. *Army role too large* indicates that a respondent said the RTA was too prominent in Thai politics. Also, at the time of the survey, the central government was aligned with the military against Thaksin and his allies. *Satisfaction w national government* is a ranking from one to four of how satisfied the respondent was with the Bangkok regime.

Incorporating these policy opinions and demographic controls, Model 2 nonetheless finds army losses are positively related to support for southern autonomy. The coefficient on RTA fatalities is positive and statistically significant. In fact, it is about 20% larger in magnitude than the estimate in the bivariate specification (Model 1). Both Models 1 and 2 imply that respondents living at the border of three recruitment regions for the RTA were more likely to support southern autonomy if their region’s army was posted in a deadlier part of the south.

Placebo test: Attitudes toward conflict in Bangkok

Are there omitted regional characteristics that explain the correlation between army fatalities and support for southern autonomy? To check on this possibility I compare army fatalities to respondents’ views in a policy domain superficially similar to the southern conflict but for which army deaths in the south had no bearing. This “placebo test” compares the army deaths from a respondent’s region to attitudes about conflict in Bangkok.

The placebo test rules out the following source of spurious correlation. Perhaps the borders between army regions happen to divide up respondents in terms of a general aversion to violence or preference for policy compromise. Army fatalities would then be positively correlated with support for southern autonomy for extraneous reasons. If this is the true data generating process, we should also see a correlation between RTA fatalities and respondents’ support for reconciliation

in a conflict that had nothing to do with those deaths. In 2010, Thailand was undergoing conflict in the capital as well as in the south. This section shows that army fatalities in the south do not predict support for compromise in that central conflict. This non-correlation bolsters the case that army fatalities in the south are specifically driving views about autonomy there, rather than being chance correlates of a taste for reconciliation.

To summarize the conflict in Bangkok: in 2001 and 2005, Thaksin Shinawatra's party won large victories in national elections. In 2006, Thaksin was overthrown in a military coup and went into exile. His allies won new elections in 2007 but their government was destabilized by opposition "yellow shirt" demonstrations in Bangkok. After judicial intervention, the anti-Thaksin Democrat Party took power in 2008. The pro-Thaksin response was a campaign of "red shirt" demonstrations in the streets of Bangkok. Red shirts characterized Thaksin opponents as anti-democratic for supporting military and judicial coups. Yellow shirts argued Thaksin was the real threat to democracy, pointing to his weakening of oversight agencies and the free press and crediting his electoral success to corruption and vote buying.

In its 2010 survey, The Asian Foundation asked respondents whether charges of terrorism against red shirt protest leaders "should be dropped to promote political reconciliation" and posed the same question regarding yellow shirt protest leaders. I coded a dummy called *Support central political reconciliation* that takes a value of one if the respondent supported dropping the charges against both yellow and red shirt leaders. Respondents who supported maintaining the charges against either or both sets of leaders are scored as a zero. About 60% of respondents nationwide supported dropping charges against both red and yellow shirt protest leaders.

Models 3 and 4 show that a general disposition toward compromise is not driving the main result. In these models the dependent variable is *Support central political reconciliation*. The sample and variables are the same as those in Models 1 and 2. RTA fatalities are negatively correlated to endorsement of central reconciliation. If respondents' general dovishness were at work, this correlation would be positive. The negative coefficient is statistically significant in bivariate Model 3. That significance drops away if control variables are included (Models 4).

The final section of this paper presents another robustness check. Instead of inferring the salience of conflict costs from army fatalities, I use respondents' opinions about the importance of conflict in the south relative to other problems in Thailand. This subjective assessment of the toll of war can be measured at the individual level, rather than assigned based on where respondents lived. Like the analysis above, the evidence is consistent with conflict costs eroding public support for a purely coercive response to southern insurgency.

Subjective ratings of conflict costs

The analysis of RTA fatalities above used a subset of respondents who lived clustered around the intersection of three army regions. As a check, I now analyze support for southern autonomy and perceived conflict importance among respondents nationwide. Support for southern autonomy was higher among respondents who ranked the conflict in the south among Thailand's major problems. I use this subjective measure as a robustness check for three reasons. First, it taps perceived costs as reported by individuals rather than being inferred from locations. Second, it is a more flexible measure than RTA fatalities. Other government personnel and civilians were being killed in southern Thailand in 2010. If these deaths influenced respondents, this measure can reflect that variation. Third, this robustness check can use the entire national sample. The national analysis includes some Pattani Malay respondents; there were none in the sample of respondents on the boundaries of the RTA's 1st–3rd army regions. For reasons I explain below, the inclusion of Pattani Malay respondents makes for a demanding test.

My measure of the perceived costs of conflict in the south is based on two open-ended questions about the biggest problems facing Thailand. Respondents who mentioned conflict in the south after either prompt are coded as a one on the measure *S. conflict important problem*.¹⁷ This variable taps

¹⁷Enumerators asked every respondent, "In your view, what is the biggest problem facing Thailand?" Respondents were also asked whether Thailand was headed in the right or wrong direction and to explain why they thought so. If a respondent volunteered that the conflict in the south was Thailand's single worst problem and/or a reason for pessimism about Thailand's direction they are

subjective assessment of the costs of conflict in the south, allowing respondents to take into account not only army deaths but other fatalities, injuries, economic losses, etc.¹⁸

A strength of this measure is that respondents were not prompted to think about conflict in the south as an important problem. A direct question asking respondents to rate the costliness of southern insurgency would probably overstate public concern (Sterngold et al., 1994). On the other hand, this question only identifies respondents who thought the southern conflict eclipsed other problems in Thailand. That standard is a high bar given the conflict in Bangkok at the time. In fact, just 6.6% of non-Pattani speakers and 38% of Pattani speakers volunteered that they were especially worried about the southern conflict.¹⁹ The low profile of the southern conflict underlines the analogy to an overseas conflict.²⁰

Controlling for ethnicity

My arguments analogizing Thailand's southern conflict to an overseas war are less apt for Pattani Malay respondents. For the vast majority of non-Pattanis, the southern insurgency was both spatially and socially removed. By contrast, most Pattani-speakers in Thailand—and all of the sur-

*coded as a one on the *S. conflict important problem* variable. The results are similar if either of the two prompts about Thailand's problems is considered individually (Tables A.17 and A.18).*

¹⁸There is a positive (though not statistically significant) correlation between army deaths and the *S. conflict important problem* variable in the sample from the RTA borders used in Table 2. See Table A.13.

¹⁹Controlling for ethnicity, respondents who thought the conflict was an important problem were similar to the entire sample in terms of age, gender, ruralness, education, and income but did show regional variation. (All Pattani speakers in the sample lived in the southern region.) Just 2.5% of respondents in the Northeast rated the conflict as important, compared to 8–10% across the other three regions. Some of the models below include region dummies as control variables.

²⁰For example, in late 2016, Gallup (2017) found just 1% of US adults rated the fighting in Iraq or versus the Islamic State as their country's most important problem.

vey's Pattani respondents—lived in or near insurgency-affected districts. Their personal exposure to violence was much higher compared to the out-of-theater population.²¹ The insurgents appeal specifically to Pattani identity. There would be obvious benefits of southern autonomy for Pattani Malays living in the south. Thus, the range of Pattani Malay public opinion is likely to include at least some outright support of the insurgents, which is unlikely among non-Pattanis.

I have included Pattani Malay respondents in the analysis below to avoid stacking the deck in my favor. Some models include a dummy variable for *Pattani Malay* respondents. In the supplementary materials (Table A.18), I estimate the correlation between *S. conflict important problem* and support for southern autonomy separately for Pattani Malays. Out-of-theater respondents are driving the results below.²²

Conflict importance and support for southern autonomy

Thais who saw conflict in the south as a major problem were more likely to support southern autonomy. Table 3, Model 5 reports a bivariate logistic regression of support for southern autonomy.²³ The coefficient on *S. conflict important problem* is positive and statistically significant. The predicted probability of supporting autonomy if a respondent did not list the southern conflict as an

²¹There are non-Pattanis living in conflict-affected districts but the sampling did not capture any of these people.

²²Table A.18. Among non-Pattanis, the positive and statistically significant relationship between conflict importance and support for southern autonomy is positive and robust. There is no statistically significant relationship between Pattani Malays' rating of the importance of southern conflict as a problem and support for southern autonomy. That non-relationship suggests the importance of distinguishing out-of-theater public support for COIN and in-theater support. Only the former is likely to be analogous to support for overseas war.

²³As before, I excluded respondents who did not answer the questions on protester pardons. In Table A.15, I include these respondents. Table A.16 uses only demographic variables as controls. Table A.14 shows unweighted results.

Table 3: Logistic regressions of respondent support for southern autonomy and for dropping charges against central protesters compared to subjective measure of costs of southern conflict

	Southern autonomy		Central political reconciliation	
	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
S. conflict important problem	0.83* (0.27)	0.95* (0.30)	-0.23 (0.27)	-0.21 (0.27)
Favors decentralization		0.98* (0.15)		-0.13 (0.15)
Army role too large		-0.029 (0.17)		0.50* (0.16)
Satisfaction w national government		0.091 (0.11)		-0.23* (0.11)
Age		-0.0011 (0.034)		-0.040 (0.033)
Female		0.13 (0.15)		0.022 (0.14)
Secondary/Vocational		0.34 (0.19)		-0.24 (0.19)
Bachelor's or higher		-0.35 (0.24)		-0.58* (0.25)
Income		0.030 (0.045)		-0.11* (0.046)
Rural		0.35* (0.14)		0.19 (0.14)
Pattani Malay		0.10 (0.41)		1.1* (0.37)
Northern region		-0.23 (0.21)		0.086 (0.21)
Northeastern region		-0.69* (0.18)		0.43* (0.17)
Southern region		-0.27 (0.24)		-0.60* (0.25)
Sampling strata	10	10	10	10
Sample size	1334	1334	1334	1334

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$

important problem is 61%. If the respondent did cite the conflict as a major problem, the predicted probability of support for autonomy goes up to 71%. The positive relationship between perceived conflict importance and support for autonomy is even larger in Model 6, which includes covariates for attitudes about decentralization, the central regime and the RTA; demographic characteristics including ethnicity; and region dummies.

A second placebo test

Finally, I use perceived costs and support for southern autonomy to repeat my earlier placebo test. Models 7 and 8 reestimate the models containing perceived importance of the southern conflict. The dependent variable is support for political reconciliation in Bangkok.²⁴ If some respondents are simply dovish, there might be a positive relationship between perceiving conflict in the south as an important problem and also supporting compromise in the capital. In that case, support for autonomy is not specific to respondents' attitudes about the south, indicating the main findings are spurious.

Instead, those who thought conflict in the south was an important problem were no more likely to endorse political reconciliation in Bangkok. A bivariate regression (Model 7) shows a negative and statistically insignificant correlation between respondent views on conflict in the south and endorsement of national reconciliation. Adding control variables (Model 8), the coefficient on southern conflict severity remains negative and insignificant. The negative signs on these correlations suggest that the results in Models 5 and 6—i.e., the positive correlation between importance of southern conflict and support for autonomy—are not driven by general dovishness.

²⁴In the Supplementary Materials, I report a placebo test that reverses the logic of the test here (Table A.19). The independent variable is whether a respondent cited conflict in Bangkok as an important problem. Support for southern autonomy is the dependent variable. A general aversion to conflict might lead a respondent to both rank conflict in the capital as highly problematic and support southern autonomy. Instead, ranking central conflict as problematic is not a predictor of support for southern autonomy.

In sum, those who thought the southern insurgency was a major problem wanted the government to offer autonomy there. People who rated the costs of conflict lower were more content for the government to stay the course. These results complement the main analysis of army fatalities. Costs of domestic counterinsurgency erode public support for hardline policies and increase support for compromising with insurgent aims.

Military fatalities and public support for COIN

A COIN adage claims that insurgents survive like fish in an ocean of civilians. The study of public opinion in civil war usually asks why the civilians in that metaphorical ocean support the government versus the insurgents. This question is relevant for people living in close spatial or social proximity to an insurgency. But most domestic counterinsurgency is against rebels who are isolated geographically and socially. Violence is not an everyday part of most civilian's lives. Civilians feel the costs of war primarily through ties to government personnel serving in the conflict zone. For the vast majority of people, materially supporting the insurgency—let alone joining it—is not tempting or even feasible. Public debate is over coercive versus conciliatory strategies to end conflict, with very few people contemplating affiliation with the insurgents. This out-of-theater perspective on COIN is analogous to public opinion during overseas war.

This study provides the first evidence of a relationship between proximity to the communities of fallen government soldiers and lower support for COIN in the context of a contemporary civil war. In 2010, Thais were more likely to support autonomy to end conflict in the south if there had been more army fatalities from their region. To support this finding, I show that army fatalities are not a predictor of generally conciliatory attitudes. Also, Thais who thought the conflict in the south was a major problem were more likely to support southern autonomy but were no more conciliatory in general.

Research is needed on the connection between military losses and public support for counterinsurgency in the context of other contemporary civil wars and with other data sources. Further

studies can establish the conditions under which military losses undermine support for domestic COIN. For example, some literature on overseas war suggests mediating influences on public opinion such as the media environment or consensus among political elites. New research could determine which nuances of the literature on public reactions to overseas war travel to the domestic COIN context.

More pointedly, I have argued that the most people in Thailand experience conflict in the south in a manner analogous to an overseas war. I cited the asymmetry of the conflict, its non-existential stakes, and its spatial and social isolation. Which, if any, of these features need to be present for military losses to depress public support for COIN? Is spatial isolation key, so that civilians do not experience the risk of violence day-to-day? Or is it most important that the insurgents are socially isolated? Is it relevant that in Thailand the insurgents made ethnic appeals, sharply defining their appeal? Or do military losses undermine support for domestic COIN under almost all conditions? Answering these questions will inform theories of how states choose military and political responses to domestic insurgency and when and why internal wars end.

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
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Military losses and public support for domestic counterinsurgency

Supplementary materials intended for online publication

Figure A.1: Provinces in Asia Foundation Survey, Fall 2010



- | | | | |
|-------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| 1 - Bangkok | 10 - Narathiwat | 19 - Ratchaburi | 28 - Trang |
| 2 - Buri Ram | 11 - Nong Khai | 20 - Rayong | 29 - Uthai Thani |
| 3 - Chiang Rai | 12 - Nonthaburi | 21 - Sakon Nakhon | 30 - Yala |
| 4 - Kamphaeng Phet | 13 - Pathum Thani | 22 - Samut Prakan | |
| 5 - Khon Kaen | 14 - Pattani | 23 - Sing Buri | |
| 6 - Lamphun | 15 - Phayao | 24 - Songkhla | |
| 7 - Lop Buri | 16 - Petchabun | 25 - Suphan Buri | |
| 8 - Nakhon Ratchasima | 17 - Phuket | 26 - Surat Thani | |
| 9 - Nakhon Si Thammarat | 18 - Prachin Buri | 27 - Surin | |

Survey items for variables in the main text and supplementary materials

The following are TAF-provided translations of their survey, which was conducted in Thai.

- **Support for southern autonomy (0/1):** “Some have suggested that political decentralization or limited autonomy (but not territorial separation) might help resolve the long-term conflict in southern Thailand. Do you agree or disagree?”
- **Support central political reconciliation (0/1):** Respondents answered two items related to charges against the main political factions in protests at the capital: “And for the leader of red shirts [who] has been accused for terrorism, do you think the lawsuit and charges should be dropped to promote the political reconciliation?” and “And for the leader of yellow shirts [who] has been accused for terrorism, do you think the lawsuit and charges should be dropped to promote the political reconciliation?” Respondents who supported dropping charges against both yellow and red shirt leaders were coded as supporting central reconciliation. Respondents who said the charges should stand against the yellow shirt leaders, the red shirt leaders, or both sets of leaders were coded as a zero.
- **Favors decentralization (0/1):** “Sometimes people in Bangkok and upcountries have different interests and different points of view; therefore, some people say that the government could work more effectively and efficiently if the power of decision making were decentralized to local governments. In addition, the governor should be directly elected (like in Bangkok). However, some people believe that the government will be more fair, more effective and more efficient if centrally controlled. Which statement is closer to your point of view? (1) Better to decentralize to local government. Or (2) The central government having the authority for decision making, as at present, would be more effective and efficient.”

If the respondent was uncertain of the meaning of decentralization, the following text was also read: “Decentralization means to decentralize power to local areas under democratic governance. It’s aimed to reduce central government’s role so that they can focus on key missions as necessary as possible [sic] and to enhance the role of local government to take over duties. The law is required to allow local government to have authority in managing works, money, and labor to solve its problems and to develop its own areas; it means some local laws can follow local interests, custom and tradition. This is based on the fundamental in which local people best know their own local problems and interests. The familiar forms of local government are Sub-District Administration Office (SAO), municipal, Provincial Administration Office (PAO), and such special districts as Bangkok and Pattaya.”

Respondents who said it was “better to decentralize to local government” (choice 1) were coded as favoring decentralization.

- **Army role too large (0/1):** “Many people think the army plays too big a role in politics in Thailand, while others see the army as an important independent institution that has helped safeguard and stabilize the country. Which is closer to your view?”
- **Satisfaction with national government (1–4):** “How do you feel regarding the job the national government is doing?” Very dissatisfied (1); Somewhat dissatisfied (2); Somewhat satisfied (3); Very satisfied (4).

- **Age (1–10):** “May I know your age please?” Less than 18 (survey terminated); 18–19 years old (1); 20–24 years old (2); 25–29 years old (3); 30–34 years old (4); 35–39 years old (5); 40–44 years old (6); 45–49 years old (7); 50–59 years old (8); 60–80 years old (9); Above 80 years old (10).
- **Female (0/1):** Coded by enumerator.
- **Secondary education (0/1):** Based on responses to the item “Could you please tell me your highest education?” Respondents who chose “Secondary school” or “Diploma/Vocational” school were coded as a 1. Respondents who chose “Primary school or below,” “Bachelors degree,” “Masters degree,” or “Doctoral degree” were coded as a zero.
- **Post-secondary education (0/1):** Based on responses to the item “Could you please tell me your highest education?” Respondents who chose “Bachelors degree,” “Masters degree,” or “Doctoral degree” were coded as a 1. Respondents who chose “Primary school or below,” “Secondary school,” or “Diploma/Vocational” school were coded as a zero.
- **Income (1–9):** Respondents were asked “Could you please tell me your monthly household income which mean[s] the income of all household members (including all sources of income)?” TAF recorded household income in three separate income scales: one for Bangkok, another for other urban respondents, and a third for rural respondents. My variable notes each respondents’ score on their local scale; thus, this is an income measure relative to the respondent’s locality, which may help to capture differences in purchasing power.

Coding	Income in 1000s of Baht [†]		
	Bangkok	Other urban	Rural
1	<15	<8	<5
2	15–24.9	8–14.9	5–7.9
3	25–49.9	15–34.9	8–19.9
4	50–59.9	35–44.9	20–22.49
5	60–69.9	45–49.9	22.5–29.9
6	70–79.9	5–59.9	30–39.9
7	80–89.9	60–69.9	40–49.9
8	90–99.9	70–79.9	50–59.9
9	≥100	≥80	≥60

[†]In mid-2010, 1000 Baht was worth about \$31 US

- **Rural (0/1):** Respondents lived in either a rural or an urban district of a province. That distinction was determined by the survey firm during sampling. All respondents in Bangkok province are in urban districts.
- **Pattani Malay (0/1):** “Normally, what language do you speak at home?” Respondents who reported that they spoke Pattani Malay or Yawa are coded as Pattani Malay.
- **Northern census region (0/1):** Coded by enumerator.
- **Northeastern census region (0/1):** Coded by enumerator.

- **Southern census region (0/1):** Coded by enumerator.
- **S. conflict important problem (0/1):** Respondents were asked (A) “In your view, what is the biggest problem facing Thailand?” Respondents were also asked (B) “Generally speaking, do you think things in Thailand today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?” and an open-ended follow-up question “Why do you say that?” Enumerators listed up to six answers to the open-ended follow-up question.

I code this variable as a one for respondents who described conflict in the south as the country’s biggest problem (Question A) or a reason for pessimism (Question B). This variable is a 0 if the respondent did not list conflict in the south in response to either survey item and had a non-missing answer to Question A and/or Question B.

In other words, this variable takes a value of one whenever *S. conflict most important problem* or *S. conflict reason for wrong direction* (see below) is coded as a one. It is coded as a zero if neither variable was coded as a one and at least one of the two variables is coded as a zero. Coded as missing if both variables are missing.

- **S. conflict most important problem (0/1):** Respondents were asked “In your view, what is the biggest problem facing Thailand?” Coded as one for respondents who described conflict in southern Thailand as the country’s biggest problem and a zero if the respondent cited a different problem.
- **S. conflict reason for wrong direction (0/1):** Respondents were also asked “Generally speaking, do you think things in Thailand today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?” and an open-ended follow-up question “Why do you say that?” Enumerators listed up to six answers to the open-ended follow-up question. This variable is a 1 if the respondent listed conflict in the south as one of the reasons Thailand was going in the wrong direction. This variable is coded as a zero if the respondent did not include the southern conflict in their list of reasons for pessimism. This variable is coded only for the 866 (61%) of respondents who thought Thailand was going in the wrong direction.
- **Bangkok conflict important problem (0/1):** Coding of this variable is analogous to the coding of the *S. conflict important problem* variable. Respondents were asked (A) “In your view, what is the biggest problem facing Thailand?” Respondents were also asked (B) “Generally speaking, do you think things in Thailand today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?” and an open-ended follow-up question “Why do you say that?” Enumerators listed up to six answers to the open-ended follow-up question.

I code this variable as a one for respondents who described political conflict in Bangkok as the country’s biggest problem (Question A) or a reason for pessimism (Question B). This variable is a 0 if the respondent did not list conflict in Bangkok in response to either survey item and had a non-missing answer to Question A and/or Question B.

Table A.1: Summary statistics for sample from provinces on the boundaries of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Royal Thai Army command regions. See Tables 2, A.7, A.8, A.9, A.12, and A.13.

	Weighted data		Unweighted data	
	Mean	Standard error	Mean	Standard error
Support for southern autonomy (0/1)	0.64	0.041	0.59	0.036
Support central political reconciliation (0/1)	0.51	0.043	0.52	0.036
S. conflict important problem (0/1)	0.076	0.022	0.021	0.010
Regional army fatalities	21	0.56	20	0.53
Favors decentralization (0/1)	0.73	0.038	0.69	0.033
Army role too large (0/1)	0.41	0.042	0.42	0.036
Satisfaction w national government (1–4)	2.4	0.054	2.4	0.047
Age (1–10)	5.1	0.21	5.1	0.17
Female (0/1)	0.56	0.043	0.52	0.036
Secondary education (0/1)	0.57	0.043	0.55	0.036
Post-secondary education (0/1)	0.12	0.029	0.12	0.024
Income (1–9)	2.7	0.12	2.8	0.12
Rural (0/1)	0.66	0.034	0.44	0.036
Observations	299			

Table A.2: Summary statistics for sample from provinces near 1st–3rd RTA command area borders including respondents who did not answer central political reconciliation questions. See Table A.10.

	Weighted data		Unweighted data	
	Mean	Standard error	Mean	Standard error
Support for southern autonomy (0/1)	0.64	0.041	0.59	0.036
Support central political reconciliation (0/1)	0.51	0.043	0.52	0.036
Regional army fatalities	21	0.56	20	0.53
Favors decentralization (0/1)	0.73	0.038	0.69	0.033
Army role too large (0/1)	0.41	0.042	0.42	0.036
Satisfaction w national government (1–4)	2.4	0.054	2.4	0.047
Age (1–10)	5.1	0.21	5.1	0.17
Female (0/1)	0.56	0.043	0.52	0.036
Secondary education (0/1)	0.57	0.043	0.55	0.036
Post-secondary education (0/1)	0.12	0.029	0.12	0.024
Income (1–9)	2.7	0.12	2.8	0.12
Rural (0/1)	0.66	0.034	0.44	0.036
Observations	314			

Table A.3: Summary statistics for sample from provinces near 1st–3rd RTA command area borders without Lop Buri and Nakhon Ratchasima. See Table A.11.

	Weighted data		Unweighted data	
	Mean	Standard error	Mean	Standard error
Support for southern autonomy (0/1)	0.61	0.053	0.55	0.046
Regional army fatalities	21	0.72	20	0.67
Favors decentralization (0/1)	0.66	0.052	0.60	0.045
Army role too large (0/1)	0.43	0.054	0.47	0.046
Satisfaction w national government (1–4)	2.4	0.072	2.4	0.060
Age (1–10)	5.0	0.28	5.0	0.23
Female (0/1)	0.52	0.055	0.49	0.046
Secondary education (0/1)	0.59	0.054	0.58	0.046
Post-secondary education (0/1)	0.11	0.036	0.11	0.029
Income (1–9)	2.6	0.16	2.8	0.15
Rural (0/1)	0.69	0.041	0.45	0.046
Observations	217			

Table A.4: Summary statistics for national sample used in Tables 3, A.14, A.16, A.17 (Models 39 and 41), A.18 (Models 43 and 44), and A.19.

	Weighted data		Unweighted data	
	Mean	Standard error	Mean	Standard error
Support for southern autonomy (0/1)	0.63	0.022	0.61	0.018
Support central political reconciliation (0/1)	0.48	0.022	0.48	0.018
S. conflict important problem (0/1)	0.11	0.016	0.033	0.0065
S. conflict most important problem (0/1)	0.030	0.0069	0.084	0.010
Bangkok conflict important problem (0/1)	0.67	0.021	0.10	0.011
Favors decentralization (0/1)	0.69	0.021	0.69	0.017
Army role too large (0/1)	0.41	0.022	0.42	0.018
Satisfaction w national government (1–4)	2.4	0.028	2.4	0.025
Age (1–10)	5.0	0.11	5.0	0.090
Female (0/1)	0.52	0.023	0.51	0.018
Secondary education (0/1)	0.53	0.023	0.54	0.018
Post-secondary education (0/1)	0.15	0.016	0.17	0.014
Income (1–9)	2.7	0.067	2.8	0.059
Rural (0/1)	0.66	0.013	0.45	0.018
Pattani Malay (0/1)	0.044	0.0073	0.050	0.0080
Northern census region (0/1)	0.18	0.013	0.19	0.014
Northeastern census region (0/1)	0.39	0.013	0.38	0.018
Southern census region (0/1)	0.098	0.0075	0.14	0.013
S. conflict reason for wrong direction (0/1)	0.099	0.015	0.67	0.017
Observations	1334			

Table A.5: Summary statistics including respondents who did not answer central political reconciliation questions. See Tables A.15.

	Weighted data		Unweighted data	
	Mean	Standard error	Mean	Standard error
Support for southern autonomy (0/1)	0.63	0.022	0.61	0.018
S. conflict important problem (0/1)	0.11	0.016	0.033	0.0065
Favors decentralization (0/1)	0.69	0.021	0.69	0.017
Army role too large (0/1)	0.41	0.022	0.42	0.018
Satisfaction w national government (1–4)	2.4	0.028	2.4	0.025
Age (1–10)	5.0	0.11	5.0	0.090
Female (0/1)	0.52	0.023	0.51	0.018
Secondary education (0/1)	0.53	0.023	0.54	0.018
Post-secondary education (0/1)	0.15	0.016	0.17	0.014
Income (1–9)	2.7	0.067	2.8	0.059
Rural (0/1)	0.66	0.013	0.45	0.018
Pattani Malay (0/1)	0.044	0.0072	0.050	0.0080
Northern census region (0/1)	0.18	0.012	0.19	0.014
Northeastern census region (0/1)	0.39	0.013	0.38	0.018
Southern census region (0/1)	0.098	0.0070	0.14	0.013
Observations	1396			

Table A.6: Summary statistics including only respondents who were asked for reasons Thailand was headed in wrong direction. See Table A.17 (Models 40 and 42) and Table A.18 (Model 45).

	Weighted data		Unweighted data	
	Mean	Standard error	Mean	Standard error
Support for southern autonomy (0/1)	0.63	0.022	0.61	0.018
Support central political reconciliation (0/1)	0.48	0.023	0.48	0.018
S. conflict reason for wrong direction (0/1)	0.099	0.015	0.67	0.017
Favors decentralization (0/1)	0.69	0.021	0.69	0.017
Army role too large (0/1)	0.41	0.022	0.42	0.018
Satisfaction w national government (1–4)	2.4	0.028	2.4	0.025
Age (1–10)	5.0	0.11	5.0	0.090
Female (0/1)	0.52	0.023	0.51	0.018
Secondary education (0/1)	0.53	0.023	0.54	0.018
Post-secondary education (0/1)	0.15	0.016	0.17	0.014
Income (1–9)	2.7	0.067	2.8	0.059
Rural (0/1)	0.66	0.016	0.45	0.018
Pattani Malay (0/1)	0.044	0.0079	0.050	0.0080
Northern census region (0/1)	0.18	0.016	0.19	0.014
Northeastern census region (0/1)	0.39	0.017	0.38	0.018
Southern census region (0/1)	0.098	0.0096	0.14	0.013
Observations	737			

Table A.7: Logistic regressions of support for southern autonomy in provinces near 1st–3rd RTA command area borders estimated without survey weights or clustering by sample strata. Robustness test for Table 2.

	Southern autonomy		Central political reconciliation	
	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Regional army fatalities	0.12* (0.019)	0.12* (0.022)	-0.044* (0.016)	-0.034 (0.018)
Favors decentralization		1.8* (0.30)		-0.35 (0.25)
Army role too large		-0.60* (0.31)		0.45 (0.27)
Satisfaction w national government		-0.14 (0.24)		-0.12 (0.20)
Age		-0.028 (0.068)		0.050 (0.058)
Female		-0.23 (0.28)		-0.32 (0.24)
Secondary/Vocational		-0.37 (0.36)		-0.13 (0.31)
Bachelor's or higher		-0.85 (0.54)		-0.41 (0.46)
Income		0.11 (0.088)		-0.12 (0.077)
Rural		0.25 (0.28)		0.18 (0.24)
Observations	299	299	299	299
<i>Ln</i> likelihood	-180	-154	-204	-196

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$

Table A.8: Logistic regressions of support for southern autonomy in provinces near 1st–3rd RTA command area borders estimated without survey weights and with standard errors clustered by province. Robustness test for Table 2.

	Southern autonomy		Central political reconciliation	
	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16
Regional army fatalities	0.12* (0.048)	0.12* (0.056)	-0.044 (0.030)	-0.034 (0.023)
Favors decentralization		1.8* (0.60)		-0.35 (0.26)
Army role too large		-0.60* (0.25)		0.45 (0.42)
Satisfaction w national government		-0.14 (0.12)		-0.12 (0.28)
Age		-0.028 (0.051)		0.050 (0.044)
Female		-0.23 (0.27)		-0.32 (0.32)
Secondary/Vocational		-0.37 (0.49)		-0.13 (0.52)
Bachelor's or higher		-0.85 (0.65)		-0.41 (0.69)
Income		0.11 (0.11)		-0.12* (0.042)
Rural		0.25 (0.44)		0.18 (0.25)
Observations	299	299	299	299
<i>Ln</i> likelihood	-180	-154	-204	-196

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$

Table A.9: Logistic regressions of support for southern autonomy in provinces near 1st–3rd RTA command area borders using logged fatalities as the independent variable. Robustness test for Table 2.

	Southern autonomy		Central political reconciliation	
	Model 17	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20
<i>Ln</i> regional army fatalities	2.1* (0.44)	2.7* (0.57)	-0.86* (0.40)	-0.65 (0.42)
Favors decentralization		1.9* (0.33)		-0.57 (0.30)
Army role too large		-0.36 (0.37)		0.39 (0.31)
Satisfaction w national government		-0.46 (0.29)		-0.053 (0.23)
Age		-0.070 (0.081)		0.068 (0.066)
Female		0.097 (0.33)		-0.34 (0.29)
Secondary/Vocational		-0.53 (0.44)		-0.065 (0.36)
Bachelor's or higher		-1.8* (0.72)		0.15 (0.55)
Income		0.10 (0.093)		-0.14 (0.093)
Rural		-0.067 (0.30)		0.17 (0.27)
Sampling strata	6	6	6	6
Sample size	299	299	299	299

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$

Table A.10: Logistic regressions of support for southern autonomy in provinces near 1st–3rd RTA command area borders including respondents who did not answer central political reconciliation questions. Robustness test for Table 2.

	Southern autonomy	
	Model 21	Model 22
Regional army fatalities	0.10* (0.021)	0.13* (0.027)
Favors decentralization		2.0* (0.33)
Army role too large		-0.22 (0.36)
Satisfaction w national government		-0.39 (0.28)
Age		-0.040 (0.079)
Female		-0.014 (0.33)
Secondary/Vocational		-0.60 (0.44)
Bachelor's or higher		-1.6* (0.67)
Income		0.097 (0.091)
Rural		-0.11 (0.30)
Sampling strata	6	6
Sample size	314	314

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$

Table A.11: Logistic regressions of support for southern autonomy in provinces near 1st–3rd RTA command area borders not including Lop Buri and Nakhon Ratchasima. Robustness test for Table 2.

	Southern autonomy		Central political reconciliation	
	Model 23	Model 24	Model 25	Model 26
Regional army fatalities	0.098* (0.026)	0.12* (0.034)	-0.014 (0.024)	-0.011 (0.026)
Favors decentralization		1.7* (0.40)		-0.44 (0.37)
Army role too large		-0.65 (0.45)		0.038 (0.38)
Satisfaction w national government		-0.35 (0.37)		0.30 (0.31)
Age		-0.098 (0.11)		0.017 (0.086)
Female		0.039 (0.42)		-0.36 (0.36)
Secondary/Vocational		-0.53 (0.59)		-0.79 (0.49)
Bachelor's or higher		-2.0* (0.88)		-1.1 (0.74)
Income		0.078 (0.12)		-0.031 (0.11)
Rural		0.056 (0.38)		-0.076 (0.34)
Sampling strata	6	6	6	6
Sample size	193	193	193	193

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$

Table A.12: Logistic regressions of support for southern autonomy in provinces near 1st–3rd RTA command area borders estimated with only demographic controls. Robustness test for Table 2.

	Southern autonomy	Central political reconciliation
	Model 27	Model 28
Regional army fatalities	0.11* (0.022)	-0.039* (0.019)
Age	-0.047 (0.078)	0.075 (0.066)
Female	0.019 (0.31)	-0.33 (0.28)
Secondary/Vocational	-0.18 (0.40)	-0.058 (0.35)
Bachelor's or higher	-1.2 (0.63)	0.16 (0.54)
Income	0.10 (0.093)	-0.14 (0.096)
Rural	-0.050 (0.27)	0.19 (0.27)
Sampling strata	6	6
Sample size	299	299

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$

Table A.13: Logistic regressions comparing army fatalities to perception that southern conflict is an important problem. The sample is from provinces near 1st–3rd RTA command area borders (Table A.1).

	S. conflict important problem	
	Model 29	Model 30
Regional army fatalities	0.033 (0.037)	0.033 (0.046)
Favors decentralization		-1.2* (0.56)
Army role too large		0.36 (0.65)
Satisfaction w national government		0.031 (0.41)
Age		0.029 (0.13)
Female		0.63 (0.58)
Secondary/Vocational		1.1 (0.78)
Bachelor's or higher		1.0 (0.91)
Income		-0.34 (0.22)
Rural		-0.36 (0.53)
Sampling strata	6	6
Sample size	299	299

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$

Table A.14: Logistic regressions of respondent support for southern autonomy without using survey weights or clustering by sample strata. Robustness test for Table 3.

	Southern autonomy		Central political reconciliation	
	Model 31	Model 32	Model 33	Model 34
S. conflict important problem	0.45*	0.49*	-0.37	-0.37
	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.22)
Favors decentralization		1.1*		-0.029
		(0.13)		(0.12)
Army role too large		-0.045		0.52*
		(0.14)		(0.13)
Satisfaction w national government		0.13		-0.21*
		(0.093)		(0.089)
Age		0.0033		-0.042
		(0.028)		(0.027)
Female		0.015		0.030
		(0.12)		(0.12)
Secondary/Vocational		0.25		-0.30*
		(0.15)		(0.15)
Bachelor's or higher		-0.25		-0.57*
		(0.20)		(0.20)
Income		0.014		-0.086*
		(0.039)		(0.038)
Rural		0.28*		0.15
		(0.13)		(0.12)
Pattani Malay		0.43		1.1*
		(0.32)		(0.31)
Northern region		0.054		0.12
		(0.18)		(0.17)
Northeastern region		-0.66*		0.49*
		(0.15)		(0.15)
Southern region		-0.45*		-0.56*
		(0.20)		(0.21)
Observations	1334	1334	1334	1334
Ln likelihood	-887	-826	-920	-869

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$

Table A.15: Reestimation of support for southern autonomy including respondents who did not answer central political reconciliation questions. Robustness test for Table 3.

	Southern autonomy	
	Model 35	Model 36
S. conflict important problem	0.81* (0.27)	0.90* (0.29)
Favors decentralization		1.0* (0.15)
Army role too large		0.022 (0.16)
Satisfaction w national government		0.085 (0.11)
Age		0.0010 (0.033)
Female		0.063 (0.14)
Secondary/Vocational		0.27 (0.18)
Bachelor's or higher		-0.34 (0.24)
Income		0.027 (0.045)
Rural		0.32* (0.14)
Pattani Malay		0.22 (0.40)
Northern region		-0.23 (0.20)
Northeastern region		-0.74* (0.18)
Southern region		-0.31 (0.23)
Sampling strata	10	10
Sample size	1396	1396

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$

Table A.16: Logistic regressions of respondent support for southern autonomy with only demographic controls. Robustness test for Table 3.

	Southern autonomy	Central political reconciliation
	Model 37	Model 38
S. conflict important problem	0.77* (0.28)	-0.17 (0.28)
Age	0.0088 (0.033)	-0.032 (0.032)
Female	0.11 (0.14)	0.0044 (0.14)
Secondary/Vocational	0.33 (0.18)	-0.17 (0.18)
Bachelor's or higher	-0.34 (0.24)	-0.52* (0.25)
Income	0.013 (0.044)	-0.10* (0.047)
Rural	0.43* (0.14)	0.16 (0.14)
Pattani Malay	0.25 (0.38)	1.2* (0.37)
Northern region	-0.13 (0.21)	0.17 (0.20)
Northeastern region	-0.62* (0.17)	0.57* (0.17)
Southern region	-0.34 (0.23)	-0.70* (0.25)
Sampling strata	10	10
Sample size	1334	1334

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$

Table A.17: Logistic regressions of alternative measure of perceived importance of the southern conflict and respondent support for southern autonomy. Robustness test for Table 3.

	Southern autonomy		Central political reconciliation	
	Model 39	Model 40	Model 41	Model 42
S. conflict most important problem	1.1* (0.38)		-0.70* (0.33)	
S. conflict reason for wrong direction		0.89* (0.40)		0.25 (0.33)
Favors decentralization	0.94* (0.16)	1.1* (0.21)	-0.13 (0.15)	-0.36 (0.21)
Army role too large	-0.028 (0.17)	-0.029 (0.21)	0.50* (0.16)	0.55* (0.21)
Satisfaction w national government	0.079 (0.11)	0.18 (0.16)	-0.22* (0.11)	-0.22 (0.15)
Age	-0.0050 (0.034)	0.011 (0.045)	-0.037 (0.033)	0.00037 (0.044)
Female	0.12 (0.15)	-0.023 (0.19)	0.030 (0.14)	-0.23 (0.19)
Secondary/Vocational	0.32 (0.19)	0.23 (0.25)	-0.24 (0.19)	-0.0081 (0.25)
Bachelor's or higher	-0.33 (0.25)	-0.27 (0.31)	-0.58* (0.25)	-0.79* (0.32)
Income	0.029 (0.046)	-0.029 (0.060)	-0.11* (0.046)	-0.078 (0.060)
Rural	0.37* (0.14)	0.33 (0.18)	0.19 (0.14)	0.28 (0.18)
Pattani Malay	0.20 (0.40)	0.69 (0.57)	1.2* (0.38)	0.66 (0.55)
Northern region	-0.21 (0.21)	-0.043 (0.29)	0.074 (0.20)	0.30 (0.28)
Northeastern region	-0.73* (0.18)	-0.60* (0.24)	0.43* (0.17)	0.67* (0.23)
Southern region	-0.31 (0.24)	-0.62 (0.33)	-0.57* (0.25)	-0.43 (0.39)
Sampling strata	10	10	10	10
Sample size	1334	737	1334	737

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$

Table A.18: Logistic regressions of respondent support for southern autonomy including interaction terms between ethnicity and conflict importance questions. Robustness test for Table 3.

	Model 43	Model 44	Model 45
S. conflict important problem	1.3* (0.34)		
Important problem x Malay	-2.0* (0.76)		
S. conflict most important problem		1.5* (0.41)	
Most important problem x Malay		-1.5 (0.90)	
S. conflict reason for wrong direction			1.2* (0.43)
Reason wrong direction x Malay			-2.5* (1.1)
Pattani Malay	0.84 (0.45)	0.48 (0.43)	1.4* (0.62)
Favors decentralization	1.0* (0.15)	0.94* (0.16)	1.1* (0.22)
Army role too large	-0.036 (0.17)	-0.036 (0.17)	-0.036 (0.21)
Satisfaction w national government	0.067 (0.11)	0.066 (0.11)	0.16 (0.16)
Age	0.0010 (0.034)	-0.0041 (0.034)	0.012 (0.045)
Female	0.14 (0.15)	0.13 (0.15)	-0.040 (0.20)
Secondary/Vocational	0.35 (0.19)	0.33 (0.19)	0.24 (0.25)
Bachelor's or higher	-0.33 (0.24)	-0.33 (0.25)	-0.22 (0.31)
Income	0.029 (0.045)	0.027 (0.046)	-0.030 (0.061)
Rural	0.37* (0.14)	0.37* (0.14)	0.37* (0.19)
Northern region	-0.24 (0.21)	-0.21 (0.21)	-0.060 (0.29)
Northeastern region	-0.69* (0.18)	-0.73* (0.18)	-0.59* (0.24)
Southern region	-0.27 (0.24)	-0.33 (0.24)	-0.60 (0.33)
Sampling strata	10	10	10
Sample size	1334	1334	737
Hypothesis test (F-statistic from Wald test with weighted data):			
<i>Importance</i> + <i>Importance</i> * <i>Pattani</i> = 0	1.1	0.0011	1.9

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$

Table A.19: Logistic regressions of respondent support for southern autonomy with independent variable for perception of conflict in Bangkok as an important problem for Thailand. Additional placebo test for results in Table 3.

	Model 46	Model 47
Bangkok conflict important problem	0.15 (0.14)	0.12 (0.15)
Favors decentralization		0.91* (0.16)
Army role too large		-0.0071 (0.17)
Satisfaction w national government		0.10 (0.11)
Age		-0.00096 (0.034)
Female		0.12 (0.15)
Secondary/Vocational		0.32 (0.19)
Bachelor's or higher		-0.32 (0.25)
Income		0.024 (0.046)
Rural		0.36* (0.14)
Pattani Malay		0.37 (0.39)
Northern region		-0.24 (0.21)
Northeastern region		-0.76* (0.18)
Southern region		-0.25 (0.23)
Sampling strata	10	10
Sample size	1334	1334

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$